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Les investissements directs étrangers en Afrique :  
quels facteurs d’attractivité en dehors des ressources naturelles ? 
Résumé 
Cette contribution de nature essentiellement empirique analyse les déterminants des IDE 
en Afrique indépendamment de l’attrait déjà bien identifié pour les ressources naturelles. 
Les anticipations faites sur les perspectives générales de ces économies influencent-elle 
les flux de capitaux entrants ? Quel rôle l’instabilité sociopolitique, approchée par les 
conséquences sociales causées par les conflits, joue-t-elle  ? Les processus de 
régionalisation renforcent-ils l’attractivité des pays qui y adhèrent ?  Sur un panel de 28 
pays africains, les résultats des estimations obtenus à l’aide de la méthode des variables 
instrumentales de Hausman-Taylor, montrent que l’impact que les prévisions peuvent 
avoir sur la décision encours d’investir dans le continent n’est pas statistiquement 
significatif. Nos résultats montrent également que, bien que négative, la corrélation 
directe entre le risque social, proxy de l’instabilité sociopolitique, et les flux 
d’investissements étrangers n’est pas systématiquement significative. En effet, les flux 
d’IDE ne se comportent pas de la même manière dans les pays traversés par des crises 
sociopolitiques. Il ressort toutefois que ces instabilités fragilisent les compétences 
nationales (capital humain) et aggravent certains maux tels que le VIH/Sida dont 
l’impact sur les investissements étrangers augmente négativement en présence du risque 
social. Cependant, l’introduction simultanément des processus de régionalisation dans 
nos estimations tend à réduire les méfaits de l’instabilité sur certaines variables 
explicatives des IDE.  
Mots-clés :  Investissements étrangers directs (IDE), économies africaines, 
prévisions/anticipations, risque et instabilité sociopolitique, l’intégration régionale 
Foreign Direct Investment in Africa:   
What are the Key Factors of Attraction aside from Natural Resources? 
Abstract  
This input, essentially empirical by nature, analyses the FDI determinants in Africa 
independently from the already clearly identified attraction of natural resources. Do 
powers of anticipation as to the general prospects for these economies influence 
incoming flows of capital? What role is played by socio-political instability connected to 
the social consequences caused by conflicts? Are the processes of regionalization 
enhancing the appeal of countries that are going down that path? From a panel of 28 
African countries, the results from estimations obtained using the Hausman-Taylor 
method of instrumental variables show that the impact of projections on any ongoing 
decision to invest in the continent is not statistically significant. Our results also show 
that, although negative, the direct correlation between social risk, a proxy of socio-
political instability, and flows of foreign investment is not systematically significant.. 
However, the fact remains that these instabilities undermine national competencies 
(human capital) and compound certain ills such as HIV/Aids, whose impact on foreign 
investment increases along a negative curve in the presence of social risk. However, the 
simultaneous introduction of regionalization processes into our estimations tends to 
lower the adverse effects of instability on certain explicative FDI variables.  
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), African economies, projections/anticipations, risk 
and socio-political instability, regional integration 
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A lot of research work has long shown the positive role of direct foreign investment with 
developing economies, providing the said economies meet a number of prerequisites  - 
(Findly, 1978, Balasubramanyuan, Salisu and David Sapsford, 1996, Borensztein, De 
Gregorio and Lee, 1998; De Mello, 1999 - or do not appear to be excessively and worryingly 
vulnerable (Guillaumont, 2001). FDI significantly affects a country’s productivity factors 
through several channels of transmission, still called spill-over effects: the acquisition and 
increase of human capital, the importation of new knowledge and production technologies…  
The purpose of this paper is not to go over this theoretical link once again but to analyse in 
empirical fashion the attraction factors for FDI in African countries. It is no secret that the 
lion’s share of foreign capital flows entering the continent’s sub-Saharan region is explained 
by the abundance of raw materials (see for example Asiedu, 2005, or the World Investment 
Directory report, 2008). According to the UNCTAD report (2009), the top ten beneficiary 
countries (Nigeria, Egypt, RSA, Morocco, Libya, the Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Madagascar) alone absorbed 82% of total investment and nine countries recorded 
FDI equal to or higher than $1 billion. The appeal of natural resources explains the uneven 
breakdown of FDI across the continent. According to the World Bank, the 24 African 
countries whose revenues are virtually all generated by oil and other mineral resources have, 
over the past 20 years, secured on average almost three-quarters of FDI flows.  
The originality of our study lies with our attempt to analyse the attraction factors of Africa for 
FDI over and above the appeal of natural resources. Through this slant we are able to query 
the existence of other structural factors – real or potential – likely to guarantee the 
reproducibility of investment and the durability of the development process. In a novel way, 
we set out to analyse the influence of anticipation processes on investment decisions for 
Africa. In fact, with a panel of 28 African countries, all with different factorial and natural 
endowments, the question is to examine statistically and econometrically the patterns of FDI 
in a configuration of socio-political instability and also to see how this instability – that we 
address through social consequences – affects the variables likely to be arguments for FDI. 
Right behind this, we also take a look at the effects of regional economic integration to see 
whether they may create credibility for the economies involved in order to attract more 
foreign capital.  
Our approach is three-phased. The first section delivers a little perspective to the direct 
foreign investment made in Africa over more than 25 years. The second section established 
the methodological bases of the empirical study by laying out the factors of attraction that are 
to be tested. The third section presents the data, justifies the selected econometric approach 
and analyses the results thus obtained.  Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Section 1. Overview of FDI made in Africa over the past 
decades  
Even though recent UNCTAD statistics (2008) indicate that the flows of FDI in Africa tripled 
between 2004 and 2007, table 1 below shows that Africa lags well behind other areas in terms 
of received levels of FDI. In 2008, the FDI inventory came to only $510.5 billion versus $978 
billion for the Americas and $1,351 billion for Asia. In 1980, Africa’s FDI inventory was 
higher than that of the Americas ($41 billion vs. $36.4 billion) and was just 15% lower than 
that for Asia. Africa has benefited much less from FDI than the two other zones, a fact which, 
on the surface at least, questions the continent’s attractiveness.  
According to the UNCTAD report (2001), a country’s or region’s attractiveness can be 
appreciated based on its FDI
1 inflow index, which measures its capacity to attract investment 
in regard to its economic situation and its competitiveness. The FDI inflow index in Africa is 
unfavourable (0.4 between 1998 and 2000 versus 1.2 for the Americas and 0.6 for Asia – 
Africa is the only zone to have lost ground compared with 1988-90), yet all the while the 
presence of considerable natural resources in certain slow-developing African economies 
“artificially credits” the international attraction of these countries.  
Table1: Evolution of FDI in developing regions between 1980 and 2008 
  Africa  Central/Latin America  Asia Pacific 
      
Mean annual growth rate for the 
variation of FDI inventory 
between 1980 and 2008 
9.81 12.68  13.84* 
FDI inflow index between 1988 
and 1990  0.60 0.80  0.60 
FDI inflow index between 1998 
and 2000  0.40 1.20  0.60 
FDI inventory level in 1980 ($US 
millions)  41097.21 36456.72  48059.23* 
FDI inventory level in 2008 (in 
$US millions)  510511.10 978056.66  1351405.39* 
*excluding China. 
Source: calculated from UNCTAD data, except the FDI inflow indices which come from UNCTAD (2001) 
The relation between incoming flows of FDI and developing economies, particularly African 
economies, is complex. International competition and the effects of globalization are forcing 
multinationals to integrate new factors into their investment decisions; besides traditional 
factors (such as natural resources, cheap labour and market size), we are now seeing 
parameters such as the dynamism of human capital, infrastructural and capitalistic 
development, the stability of institutional and juridical regimes, and the effects of proximity 
or the business climate in the receiver country. In the case of Africa, the backwardness 
accumulated in these areas is tending to weaken the international credibility of certain 
countries. While the range of investors has diversified in Africa over the past ten years, with 
most notably the Asian offensive (see for example Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009), we can but 
                                                 
1 This index is the average of the three indicators that measure the share of each country in world DFI compared 
with its share in GDP, employment and exports. According to the organization, “an index of 1 signifies that a 
country’s share in world DFI corresponds to its economic weight as measured by the three indicators in 
question…” p.16 Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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observe the fact that the raw material sector is still the most attractive, as shown by the recent 
report from the UNCTAD (2009).  
Investment in Africa may be grouped into three categories.  
Firstly, we observe investment generated by the presence of significant raw materials that are 
independent of the receiver country’s performances or productive structures. In the eyes of 
investors, the country’s attractiveness lies solely with the potential of fossil and mineral 
resources and not with economic or human competencies. This is most notably the case of 
Angola, Equatorial Guinea, the Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The drawback 
with this type of investment is that it promotes the sectorial concentration of an activity while 
undermining the economy’s full articulation. There may be positive effects of externality or 
knock-on effects if, and only if, the State takes care to assure the reallocation of resources to 
other productive sectors to ensure economic pick-up. 
The second form of investment entering Africa is that which tends to follow the structural 
evolution of the receiving country. This form of FDI lies with the perception and approach 
that investors have of the country’s dynamism in terms of creating new opportunities. To 
illustrate this strategic behaviour, which tends to attract new capital, we might cite the 
example of Mauritius Island and, to a lesser extent, of Zimbabwe (before the agrarian reform, 
i.e. before 2000) with the development of the financial sector, and the case of Nigeria, where 
the development of telecommunications and the restructuring of the banking sector have 
triggered significant international investment. Indeed, the reform of the banking sector 
instigated in 2005 by the country’s monetary authorities (to reduce the number of banking 
establishments from 84 to 25 “credible” banks) is designed to galvanize the sector by carving 
out an international niche.  According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, this reform has led to a 
massive inflow of investment funds, in the region of $2.11 billion
2, making the banking sector 
the prime receiver of significant capital outside the oil sector. 
The last form of FDI we can list is that which takes account of the maturity of certain African 
economies and/or the closeness of these economies to developed economies, like South 
Africa, Tunisia or Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Morocco. In this configuration, the credibility 
of these countries with regards investors lies primarily with their international economic 
competitiveness. As emphasized by P. Hugon (2006), African economies are still dominated 
by a rationale of annuities, where enrichment stems more from capturing wealth rather than 
from creating it. Countries leaning towards economic maturity are effectively attempting to go 
beyond this annuity-based line of thought by creating new opportunities to boost their 
economy.   
Generally speaking, the African continent, especially the sub-Saharan zone, is looking at the 
absolute necessity to restructure its institutional and regulatory framework to strengthen 
international credibility.  
In addition to necessary reforms, these countries also need to manage and contain the risks 
that curb the enthusiasm of investors and additionally degrade the continent’s exterior image. 
Indeed, for economic operators, the African continent is generally more marked by high 
country-risks than it is by economic opportunities, most notably because of political 
instabilities, the failure to respect private property and the inefficiency of surveillance 
                                                 
2  In addition, at the end of 2005, a flow of $US 500 million in direct foreign investment was felt likely 




3. With respect to the violation of property, the real fear factors are not so much the 
risk of nationalization, more the risks of depreciation further to riots, civil wars or social 
unrest, and the risk of predation from the receiving State which is omnipresent in the 
country’s economic sphere. Other types of risk are frequent on this continent, such as 
government defaulting on payments, a phenomenon which refuses to go away owing to the 
importance of the role of public authorities in the economy. This is compounded by the risks 
of performance tied to the problem of good governance and the interference of respective 
governments. This problem of interference and non-transparency leads on to other extremely 
constrictive risks. They involve firstly the absence of rule of law, or more precisely the 
absence of stability or the non-respect of business law and private property. And secondly 
administrative hold-ups and corruption – even though their impact is open to argument. Thus, 
these country-related risks, compounded by the existence of markets that are unstructured, 
scattered (very little inter-connection) and too small, give the majority of African economies 
low credibility and very little attractiveness for FDI compared with their Asian counterparts.  
According to a study conducted by F. Bonaglia, A. Goldstein and C. Richaud (2002)
4 which 
aimed to gauge structural and institutional reforms in African from a qualitative and 
quantitative perspective, it emerged that the countries that introduced the greatest number of 
reforms between 1985 and 1997 are those in the south of the continent. Amongst others, they 
include Botswana, Mauritius Island, South Africa (RSA) and Tanzania, and to a lesser extent 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Addressing these reforms, the aim of which is to improve conditions 
of domestic production, on the one hand creates high international credibility for the countries 
concerned and on the other reflects a firm political commitment to laying new bases for 
development and economic policy.  
Indeed, reforms that are in tune with incoming flows of FDI are those that dwell more on : i) 
openness of the economy to competition; ii) incentives to invest in an environment 
characterized by the ‘‘lesser State’’ where conditions are conducive to doing business; iii) the 
limitation of the effects of distortion from the tax regime on the decisions taken by private 
economic agents; and iv) the very clear definition of local regulations governing investment. 
It is certainly the improvement made to these key points that has enabled certain regions to be 
more dynamic than others in terms of attractiveness for FDI, as shown by graph 1. It shows 
that SADC, UMA and to a lesser extent CEDEAO have built up a greater inventory of capital 
than the rest of the continent.  
                                                 
3 Issues of democracy and human rights remain secondary, even marginal  
4 F. Bonaglia, A. Goldstein & C. Richaud (2002),  Measuring Reform, Study from the OECD Development 
Centre. Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Graph 1. Comparative evolution of FDI inventory between African regions ($US 
millions) $) 
 
Source: produced using data from UNCTAD. Note: UMA+ includes member states plus Egypt. 
CEDEAO+ concerns all West African countries. CEA+IGAD encompasses all East African countries. 
The transformation of the worldwide economic sphere has also translated to the renewal of 
the driving forces of FDI. The role of technical progress, human capital, political ingenuity 
and regional clout is assuming ever greater proportions in the geographical implantation or 
relocation of firms. According to the UNCTAD report (2001), natural resources alone are 
increasingly not enough to attract FDI, and the same goes for cheap labour. In other words, 
countries which for years have banked on basic raw materials to fuel international capital are 
now having to restructure their economy to secure sustainable external input. Many empirical 
studies converge and all show that a country that adopts a policy of openness plus a good 
level of human capital plus a sufficiently diversified economic structure increases not only its 
appeal potential but also the spill-over effects generated by FDI on economic growth and the 
productiveness of factors (R. Findly,1978, R. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997, Borensztein et 
alii, 1998). The robustness of the impact of FDI on the economic growth of emerging 
countries is a relevant argument that supports competition between countries in one and the 
same region in terms of attracting foreign capital. For governments, there exists an array of 
instruments with which to appeal to multinationals: subsidies, lower charges and tax relief, 
repatriation rights for capital and a policy of competition to guarantee a substantial market 
share for newly relocated companies. Many African countries (Gabon, Swaziland, 
Botswana...) have reviewed their investment codes in a way that is more favourable to foreign 
investors.  
Section 2. Implementation of the empirical approach to test 
factors of attraction for FDI  
For a multinational, the choice of location for investment in a country (or a region) depends in 
part on the credibility it has achieved. This credibility translates to the perception that 
investors have of a country (or region), i.e. anticipations sensed at an early stage by the 
holders of capital as to the prospects for, and economic potential of, the receiving country. In 
the case of African countries, several questions may be asked. Do flows of received 
investment reflect the degree of credibility? In other words, do the projections made as to 
African economic prospects explain the interest shown in these countries in terms of cross-
frontier investment?  Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Explicitly, we may formalize these questions as follows:  ) , ( 1
e
t t t t y y f I + =  (1), implying the 




5 behaviour of the receiving country’s economy (approached through growth in GDP 
per capita). Thus, the way in which this economy evolves between t and t+1 will weigh on its 
credibility, thus constituting a decision factor for companies. 
i) Under the assumption of an adaptive approach to projections y, we place using the adaptive 




t t y y y λ λ + − = + 1 1   ) 1 (     with  [ ] 0, 1 ë ∈ .  
According to C. Gourieroux and A. Monfort (1995), this formulation is equivalent to the 
extrapolative form of the adaptive equation as follows, where
6 
retards   de   nombre     le    j   avec     (1.1),        
0 j
j ) - (1   1   j t y e
t y t − ∑
∞
=
= + λ λ  
(where j = the number of delays). 
By replacing the projection value of y with its adaptive value (we simplify by placing j = 1), 
we can re-write the expression (1) in the context of a linear panel as follows:  
(2),      1 it it i it i i it y y a I ε β α + + + = −         (2.1)           ) 1 ( o￿   λ − λ = β  
 i is each country and t the time argument. According to C. Hsaio (1986), the error term is 
composed  ) ( it t i it ν ϕ μ ε + + = of a specific effect ( i μ ) which captures the timeless effects, of a 
specific time effect ( ) t ϕ which controls all evolutions in time likely to affect the whole 
country, and a stochastic process ( it v ) designating the component of the total remainder and 
supposed to respond to the usual assumptions, i.e. following a normal law of null average and 
constant variance. 
Equation (2) tests the validity of anticipation assumptions, i.e. whether the predictions over 
the economy significantly affect the decision of multinationals. For this, the issue implies the 
relation (2.1) as a function of the regression of β in (2). Formally, the tests consists in 
verifying with a null hypothesis
6, H0:  β λ λ = − ) 1 (   (3) 
ii). Problems of endogeneity. However, the econometric relation (2) may engender a problem 
of endogeneity between it it y I et     inasmuch as the growth in per capita GDP in our model is 
potentially endogenic. Indeed, the link of causality between the two variables works both 
ways, even if we feel very strongly that ) ( 1 + = t t y f I and that   ...n.   2,   1, j   avec     ) ( = = − j t t I f y  
To guard against this slant of simultaneity, we shall instrumentalize the variable  t y by adding 
in information relative to the variables (X) that are likely to determine it. Note that in 
instrumentalizing  t y in this way, we are moving towards the assumption of rational 
                                                 
5 tY
e 
t+1 designates the forecast Y t+1 at date t      
6 This assumption of H0 comes down to verifying the second order equation  0
2 = − + − β λ λ As a function of 
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anticipations which takes account of all available updated data to formulate a rational 
projection. By replacing ) ( it it X f y = , we may re-estimate equation 2 as follows:  





ikt ik it i i it x y a I ε + δ + β + = ∑
=
−
         
k  identifies each variable contained in X.  The empirical equation (4) tends to be richer and 
more augmented than equation (2) and we then discount β β ′ ≠ . However, the validity 
method for anticipations remains the same at (3), i.e. H0 :  β λ λ ′ = ′ − ′ ) 1 ( (5). For anticipation 
or projection processes to act in current behaviours of DFI flows, H0 simply has to be 
statistically significant: a positive sign with the coefficient reflects a stimulator effect of 
projections  ) ( 1
e
t t y + on t I , while a negative sign predicts just the opposite. 
The evolution of GDP, which gives an insight into a country’s credibility, depends on a 
certain number of both economic and structural factors. These factors are retained as a 
function of the potential impact they may also have on a country’s international attractiveness. 
This is all a question of political and economic innovation (IPE), human development 
(DHUM) and infrastructural development (DINF), national specifics of a country’s economic 
openness.  IPE, DHUM  and DINF are composite indicators that we shall build as the 
weighted sums of certain relative  instruments. The weighting of these instruments basically 
takes account of the significant
7 and respective impact of each variable on incoming foreign 
investment flows. 
i)  Political and economic innovation is a composite indicator that is supposed to measure 
the  will  or the policies implemented by the government to galvanize a country’s 
attractiveness. This indicator is designed as a function of variables relative to the international 
incentive to invest (INCIT) and to domestic investment (IDOM). INCIT is an index which 
evaluates the policies recommended by States to encourage and attract foreign investment 
(code for foreign investment, restrictions on foreign company ownership, repatriation of 
profits, etc.). The scale of this index ranges from a very favourable State (scoring 100) to a 
very unfavourable State (scoring 0) regarding foreign investment. IDOM is the ratio of 
domestic private investment (e.g. FDI) to GDP. Its introduction makes it possible to grasp the 
effects of crowding out or crowding in, often a subject of debate in economic literature with 
regards the interaction between foreign and domestic investors (L. De Mello,1999 ; J. R. 
Markusen et alii, 2000; A. Agosin & R. Mayer, 2000). To the best of our knowledge, no work 
to date has successfully reached a consensus on the relation between foreign investment and 
domestic investment. Additionally, the sense and direction of the relation is not systematic 
when the study targets a certain number of countries (B. Bosworth and S. Collins, 1999). 
Alongside these two variables, we add the democracy variable (DEMO), which ranges from -
10 (totalitarian regime) to +10 (democratic regime), should this prove to be significant and 
regardless of the sense and direction of impact. Our empirical predictions expect a positive 
effect from democracy on a country’s attractiveness, even though when it comes to 
movements of capital around the world this factor of political freedom is far from being a 
condition sine qua non for the inflow of foreign investment. By contrast, it may be an 
additional asset for a country that cares about its political image on the international stage.   
So generally speaking, we may place the following equation: 
                                                 
7 We have arbitrarily limited this threshold of significativity to below 10% Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
10 
 
  DEMO b IDOM b INCIT b IPE i it i it i it 3 2 1 + + = , where b is the weight of the variable on 
the incoming flow of DFI. Following the variables that go to make it up, the expected sign for 
the political and economic innovation indicator is positive.  
ii)  Human development (DHUM) is a composite indicator which informs as to the 
physical, moral and intellectual condition of a country’s human capital. We measure this 
using three variables likely to be instruments of these three notions and depending on whether 
or not they are statistically significant. Thus, we address DHUM  through the weighted sum of 
variables relative to intellectual (education/human capital), physical (health) and moral 
(corruption) aspects.  
For education, if we consider FDI as a strategy for companies to disperse their production 
processes into stages and to localize their activities as a function of international price factor 
differences (the vertical model of DFI), human capital is then a part of these determinants 
whose characteristics are peculiar to the labour market of the receiving country. Importantly, 
it makes it possible to apprehend the receiving country’s capacity and dynamism in terms of 
economically and durably reproducing the spill-over effects captured by that country. The 
greater and more dynamic this capital, the higher the quality and the greater the added value 
of incoming investment. Likewise, several studies have shown that the dissemination of 
technological innovations is rather receptive and significant in countries endowed with 
efficient human capital (M. Borenztein et alii, 1998). Human capital is introduced into 
econometric models in different ways because its measurement is anything but easy. (J.C. 
Berthélemy et alii, 1997)
8. In our case, we have approximated the inventory of educative 
development not through the inventory or level of the educated or trained population but 
rather through the absence thereof. In other words, we address human capital in an inverse 
manner (1- education) through the level of illiteracy. Through this approach, we have looked 
to highlight the effects of a non-schooled workforce on incoming foreign investment. This 
inversed approach also undertakes to report on whether human capital remains an important 
factor in the eyes of investors. A significant negative sign before the variable coefficient 
signifies that the lack of human capital is crucial to the attractiveness of the economies under 
consideration. From another side, (1- education) is justified inasmuch as, to interpret the 
impact of DHUM, each component variable needs to have an effect on DFI pulling in the 
same direction as the indicator’s other variables.  
Alongside the absence of human capital, we add the health variable, whose proxy is given by 
the level of prevalence of HIV/AIDS
9. According to certain specialists in health economics 
(M. Over, 1998), the introduction of this non-linear variable in a regression model must firstly 













log  with  t.vih the level 
of prevalence of HIV/AIDS and lVIH its logit transformation. We reckon on a negative 
impact of HIV/AIDS on foreign investment. Indeed, the speed at which the virus is spreading 
and the derisory policies implemented to counter the scourge may be factors of disinvestment 
in Africa. All the more so in that the antiretroviral treatments are inadequate to cover the 
strata of the population infected by the virus. In 2007, the percentage of infected persons 
receiving antiretroviral therapy was 3.43% in RSA, 7.8% in Zambia and 19.3% in Botswana. 
                                                 
8 We can measure it through the average number of years of schooling for populations of an age to go out and work (J-C. Berthélemy and L. 
Söderling, 2000; J. Sousa et J. Lochard, 2004), or through the level of schooling in secondary education weighted by the share of the 
corresponding age bracket (N.G. Mankiw, D. Romer, D.N. Weil, 1992 ; R.G. King & R. Levine, 1993). 
9 The level of prevalence of HIV/AIDS is preferred to public health expenditures for two reasons. 1). Econometrically the variable coefficient 
for public health expenditures is not significant in our different estimations. 2). For the same reason as our preferring (1-education), we want 
all the component instruments of DHUM to move in the same direction. Their impact on DFI must be correlated with the same sign to enable 
interpretation of DHUM.  Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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To broaden the DHUM composite, we have integrated the moral aspect approximated by the 
corruption factor. The impact of corruption on DFI depends on the size and the nature of 
incoming investment. For example, despite the very high levels of corruption in the public 
administrations of Nigeria, the Cameroon and Angola
10, the attractive sectors of these 
different countries continue to capture significant amounts of foreign private capital. Thus, 
depending on the nature and orientation of foreign investment in a country, the impact on DFI 
of corruption may be neutral or insignificant. Indeed, we surmise that there are two levels of 
corruption, one passive and the other active and harmful to the business environment. In other 
words, there is a critical threshold which calls for increased vigilance because beyond this 
level corruption becomes a noxious factor for the optimal allocation of resources. On this 
premise, by introducing corruption into our estimations, we estimate being able to ascertain 
whether African countries have reached this critical threshold, which significantly penalizes 
foreign investment. But firstly we must transform it because the way in which it is indexed 
prohibits any direct inclusion. Indeed, the statistics we have give an indexation of corruption 
from 0 (very high levels of corruption) to 100 (very low levels of corruption)
11. But, we want 
all DHUM component variables to pull in the same direction to give a clearer interpretation. 
To this end, we have transformed the corruption index as follows: 
100 ) / 1 ( × = corruption Corr . Thus, scoring is inversed, with highly corrupt countries having a 
higher score than countries where corruption is low.  
Generally, we place it i it i it i it Corr b lVIH b ￿ducation b DHUM 6 5 4 ) 1 ( + + − = . The expected sign 
for the DHUM composite indicator is normally negative because considering the way in 
which components have been specified, it designates inadequacies in terms of human 
development. 
iii)  The last composite indicator concerns the development of a country’s infrastructures 
(DINF). This indicator assembles variables such as the mileage of asphalted roads (ROUTE), 
the number of mobile phones per inhabitant (PHONE)
12 and the electricity consumption per 
inhabitant in KWh (ELEC). Specified in this way, the DINF variable is preferable to public 
expenditures because it is more relevant in directly integrating the reality of a country’s 
infrastructure. Furthermore, directly accounting for a country’s level of infrastructures makes 
it possible to fairly analyse the efforts made by the authorities to modernize the living 
conditions of populations. Whereas the introduction of public expenditures into the model in a 
general manner is fallacious and may distort the study given that a significant share of the 
budget allocated to public expenditures is not utilized in an efficient manner.  
it i it i it i it ELEC b PHONE b ROUTE b DINF 9 8 7 + + =  
iv)  Next to these constructed composite indicators, we implicate variables concerning 
national specifics, i.e. variables whose impact may vary from one country to the next and 
whose significativity is not systematic. This effectively involves the size of the national 
population (POP) and military-political-civil instability (Trouble). The population may be 
considered as a variable likely to explain flows of incoming FDI if we consider that 
multinationals are looking to win significant shares of the domestic and regional market. 
Thus, the number of inhabitants may reflect potential (gross) demand. However, in the case of 
Africa, its inclusion in the estimation may be open to argument notably on account of the low 
level of real income per inhabitant, a characteristic of the majority of the countries in our 
                                                 
10 From Transparency International (2007).  
11 Taken from Heritage Foundation (2008) 
12 The number of mobile phones is preferred to fixed phone lines per inhabitant because this figure is growing faster. Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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sample. From this, the real impact of the population on incoming FDI may be undermined or 
even cancelled out by the level of national (monetary) poverty, of inequality or inadequacy of 
spending power. For this variable to be relevant, it has to be corrected by the spending power 
of households or their marginal propensity to consume. So the population variable may be 
relevant when considered regionally inasmuch as a company may relocate in a country with 
sights set on the regional market. However, we suspect a positive sign in its coefficient. 
The other nation-specific aspect concerns socio-political and military unrest translating to 
civil wars, ethnic conflicts and other troubles (Trouble) which we approach with a silent 
variable equal to 1 for periods of unrest, otherwise 0. Many studies have shown that social 
instability marked by civil wars or ethnic violence or again sudden changes of political regime 
help to increase the country risk, which is one of the obstacles to investment. Obviously, a 
stable and secure environment is more conducive to good business than an unstable and 
uncertain environment. However, the case of Africa leads us to put this analysis into 
perspective, or at least to pose certain conditions. Indeed, FDI does not behave in the same 
way for every country in the event of civil instability. In the table in appendix 1, we see that 
during critical periods, some countries blessed with significant and strategic natural resources 
continue to absorb foreign capital (Algeria, Angola, Ivory Coast, Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria). 
Moreover, in Angola inflows of FDI attained an historical high in 2003 before the end of the 
civil war. But countries that are devoid of strategic natural resources see FDI slump during 
periods of unrest. So, by comparing the density of flows of incoming FDI over the two 
periods, we can but conclude that FDI during times of stability is higher than accumulated 
sums during periods of instability (graph 2). 
Graph 2. Density of incoming flows of FDI in times of stability (0) and instability (1) 
between 1980 and 2007 
 
Note: lnSide =  log of the sum of incoming FDI p.a. in times of stability (0) and instability (1) respectively. 
Source: author. 
Additionally, the mean comparison test backs up the information given by graph 2. When 
comparing statistically the difference in mean sums of incoming FDI between periods (0) and 
periods (1) from 1980 to 2007, we achieve the following results: Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Table 2. Mean comparison test for incoming flows of FDI in times of stability (0) and 
periods of instability (1).  




(observation = 133) 
-0.463 
(t-stat = 2,154) 
This test lies with the assumption of equality of variances. We also find the same results when 
dropping this assumption, i.e. considering variances to be unequal. 
In other words, we can but conclude that the mean figure for flows of capital in times of 
stability is higher than that seen in times of instability.  
To better show the impact of the Trouble variable on incoming FDI, we increase it with the 
social “magnitudes”
13 it causes. This effectively means the human (number of deaths) and 
material consequences resulting from wars or ethnic/civil/military violence. The Centre for 
Systemic Peace (2008) measures this social magnitude on a scale of 1 (unsubstantial 
consequences) to 10 (serious consequences). Thus, to grasp the social risk (RISK) for each 
country, we modify each year of unrest with the related social magnitude (MS), which gives 
an idea of the real risk within the country. RISK = Trouble x MS.  
On this basis, we have built a graph (graph 3 below) which casts light on the relationship 
between the mean flows of FDI per country and the social risk. Observations back up the idea 
whereby international investment does not react in the same way, depending on the instability 
in each country. Countries rich in natural resources tend to retain their appeal despite the high 
social risk (Nigeria, RSA, Algeria), whereas countries with fragile economies seriously need 
to preserve social and political stability.  
                                                 
13  See appendix 1 and Centre for Systemic Peace (2008) Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Through these demonstrations, we simply wish to show that the cited socio-political 
instability has a relative effect on FDI in Africa. Thus, we expect a negative sign for the 
coefficient but with no certainty as to significativity, and suspect that its introduction into the 
model might undermine the other variables. 
To finish, we take account of the economic openness of the countries addressed by way of a 
dichotomy variable (REGION) equal to 1 if the country belongs to a form of regional 
integration, otherwise 0. Lastly, according to economic literature, we implicate the monetary 
volatility of countries (volatility of exchange rates with the dollar or VER $) 
Section 3. Econometric analyses: methodology, results and 
interpretations  
We have worked on incoming flows of FDI in 28 African countries between 1980 and 2007. 
Our data comes from various official sources. The statistics concerning flows of FDI and 
national population come from the stats manual of the UNCTAD (available online); data for 
GDP, education, HIV/AIDS, domestic investment and infrastructures (roads, electricity, 
mobile telephony) are taken from World Bank sources (WDI, 2000, 2006) and from the 
African Bank for Development (2006, 2009). Data pertaining to corruption and the index 
relative to the freedom of foreign investment (incentives to invest) are taken from the 
Heritage Foundation data base (2006, 2008). The democratic regime and unrest or socio-
political instability figures come from the annual classification of Polity III, IV and V and 
from the Centre for Systemic Peace. FDI and domestic investment are related to GDP. With 
the exception of Democracy, all variables are expressed in log.  Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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We have preferred to work with a panel of estimation techniques to exploit the temporal 
specifics and heterogeneity of our sample, which implicates a set of countries whose nature of 
individual effects appears to be significant. Well before opting for panel estimation 
techniques, we conducted specification tests to verify the homogeneity of the process 
generating data for our sample. In other words, through the Lagrange multiplier test, 
examining specifications helps to determine whether or not the panel estimations are justified. 
The Fischer statistic applied to the model confirms the use of panel data even though not 
cylindered. The different models that are the subject of our estimations are in the form of 
equation (4). 
The results obtained from our different estimations (correcting the slant of estimations due to 
the heteroskedasticity of errors by the White method) are given in the table below. To choose 
between fixed and random effects, the Hausman test applied to the different models is unable 
to reject the null assumption of correlation between individual effects and explicative 
variables. So our choice remains focused on the compound error estimator. However, the 
presence of a potentially endogenous variable (IDOM) – even if the applied Hausman test 
does not validate it – has prompted us to compare the results obtained with the Hausman-
Taylor (HT) estimator of instrumental variables. The use of this estimator may also be 
justified by the fact that the compound error estimator supposes as null the correlation 
between specific effects and explicative variables. However, in our estimations, we have a 
rather high correlation, albeit negative (-0.75). To apply the HT estimator, we have added an 
invariant variable in time to allow validation of the tests. To this end, we have chosen the land 
area of each country. Economically speaking, geographic land area may be seen as a proxy 
justifying the prospecting of raw materials. The larger a country geographically, the greater 
the likelihood of finding other exploitable resources. 
In our estimations, one of the tests concerns the role of anticipations without however 
specifying their nature. Under the null hypothesis, the test  β λ λ ′ = ′ − ′ ) 1 ( verifies whether the 
future evolution of an economy affects ongoing foreign investment. What emerges is that the 
weight of anticipations is not globally and clearly confirmed. Compound errors show clearly 
that in the case of Africa, the projected behaviours of economies significantly and statistically 
affect present FDI. An anticipation made in time t of 1% of additional economic growth over 
the forthcoming period (t+1) creates credibility for the country by generating almost half a 
percentage point of incoming FDI over the present period. But tests with HT lead us to put 
this result into perspective because the hypothesis is not statistically significant. Given the 
possible correlation of specific effects with explicative variables under random effects, the 
estimations of Hausman-Taylor instrumental variables appear relevant. Following these 
results with HT, we may deduce that anticipations are insufficient to justify a share of the 
incoming flows of FDI in the 28 African countries under study. This non significativity is 
explained by the behaviour of variables likely to influence the credibility of countries under 
study. Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Table 3. FDI determinants in Africa 
 












' β     -0.703 -0.724 -0.735 -0.568  -0.600 -0.717 
    (2.78)*** (3.51)*** (3.49)*** 
  (1.19) (1.25)  (1.47) 
Domestic investment    -0.810  -0.912  -0.947  -0.646  -0.667  -0.717 
    (2.76)*** (3.29)*** (3.20)*** 
  (2.43)** (2.50)**  (2.68)*** 
International incentives    0.817  1.032  0.874  0.707  0.779  0.729 
    (2.29)** (2.89)***  (2.60)*** 
  (1.87)* (2.02)**  (1.89)* 
Levels of illiteracy    -0.915  -0.856  -0.865  -1.850  -1.914  -1.815 
    (2.83)*** (2.94)*** (3.18)*** 
  (1.40) (1.45)  (1.41) 
Prevalence HIV/AIDS   -0.290  -0.306  -0.389  -0.440  -0.375  -0.500 
    (2.73)*** (3.64)*** (4.76)*** 
  (1.62)* (1.34)  (1.75)* 
ROUTE   -0.322  -0.330  -0.328  -0.187  -0.216  -0.237 
    (2.53)** (2.65)***  (2.78)*** 
  (0.52) (0.59)  (0.66) 
ELEC   -0.178  -0.019  -0.020  -0.303  -0.135  -0.104 
    (1.14) (0.13)  (0.14) 
  (0.79) (0.33)  (0.25) 
PHONE   0.209  0.198  0.197  0.215  0.196  0.194 
    (4.91)*** (4.59)*** (4.51)*** 
  (2.51)** (2.22)**  (2.23)** 
Population   0.363  0.411  0.419  -1.383  -1.285  -0.660 
    (1.41) (1.78)*  (1.79)* 
  (0.81) (0.75)  (0.42) 
Land Area   -0.077  -0.157  0.040  0.161  0.253  0.308 
    (0.22) (0.60)  (0.19) 
  (0.07) (0.11)  (0.15) 
VER  $   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
    (2.86)*** (2.84)*** (2.59)*** 
  (0.86) (0.76)  (0.67) 
Regional Integration   0.148  0.507  0.244  -0.123  0.101  0.011 
    (0.36) (1.12)  (0.46) 
  (0.25) (0.19)  (0.02) 
Democracy     0.001  0.003    0.009  0.006 
     (0.07)  (0.17) 
   (0.26)  (0.18) 
Corruption     0.065  0.071    0.061  0.063 
     (1.64)  (1.92)* 
   (1.02)  (1.07) 
Social Risk   -0.214    -0.299  -0.160    -0.163 
    (1.19)   (1.75)* 
  (1.38)   (1.40) 
Constant   7.691  6.479  4.681  34.288  30.789  22.071 
   (2.06)**  (2.35)**  (1.78)*  (0.90)  (0.86)  (0.71) 
              
Observations   237  237  237  237 237  237 
R²   0.201  0.188  0.193       
Wald Test     109.74 [13]  173.09[14]  189.41[15]  57.05 [13]  56.08 [14]  58.06 [15] 












Sargan Test, p-value         0.888  0.977  0.867 
* significant at 10%,  ** at 5% and  *** at 1%.  The absolute values of robust z-statistics are in parentheses. 
The Sargan test tests the null hypothesis of the validity of instruments. Here, the test’s probabilities do not allow 
us to reject this hypothesis.  β λ λ ′ = ′ − ′ ) 1 ( : H0 verifies the impact of anticipation 1 + t y on FDI. Our results 
diverge depending on the estimator: significant with random effects and non-significant with Hausman -Taylor. 
[..] degree of freedom. Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Although significativity is greater with the compound error estimator than with that of 
Hausman –Taylor, the latter tends to seriously confirm certain results obtained with the first 
estimator, although it also corrects them. The solidity of these results evidences the presence 
of the crowding out effect between the two sources of investment, the importance of incentive 
policies, the suspicion of foreign investors as to the spread of HIV/AIDS and the major role of 
the development of telecommunication resources across the continent from the perspective of 
attractiveness for FDI.  
Whichever estimator is applied, the econometric outcomes show overall that crowding-out is 
widespread across the whole continent – the  coefficient of the IDOM variable is regularly 
negative and significant in the region of 1 to 5%. There is nothing ambiguous about this result 
because we find similar outcomes with the fixed effects method. In real terms, this result may 
be illustrated through the Chinese offensive now sweeping Africa, which is not only oriented 
towards heavy, capital-intensive and labour-intensive industry but also diversifying out to the 
purchase of local SMB and SMI and the opening up of local store and merchant businesses. 
Our findings also confirm the economic theory prediction whereby better strategy in terms of 
incentive policies remains highly favourable to FDI. Incentives to invest have a very high 
impact when not taking any account of the social risks generated by conflicts (column 2: 
1.032 with random effects and 0.779 with HT). Amongst other things this reflects the efforts 
being made by African countries to get back into the race to attract international investment in 
the same way as other developing countries in Asia and the Americas. While the development 
of telecommunication resources is one of the attraction arguments, its degree of significativity 
declines when applying the HT estimator, shifting from 1% (with random effects) to 5% 
(HT). Suspicion regarding the HIV/AIDS pandemic is still penalizing for the economies 
included in our sample. The coefficient for the HIV prevalence level variable increases with 
the HT estimator, going as far as -0.5, but the degree of significativity falls by 1% to 10%. 
With the HT estimator, we observe that the HIV prevalence level becomes significant when 
the social risk is introduced, thus implying that its impact on FDI would be conditioned by the 
country’s environmental and social instability. We might also suppose that these two 
variables, both obstacles, are more active simultaneously than separately
14. 
The negative and significant impact at 1% of the level of illiteracy on flows of incoming FDI 
obtained with the compound errors estimators is not confirmed by the HT regressions as far as 
the threshold of significativity is concerned. While these coefficients rise very considerably 
with the HT estimation (rising from -0.856  to -1.914 column 2), the critical threshold falls 
sharply by 1% to 15% (column 2). However, the information to ponder, despite this heavy 
correction, is that the absence of human capital is a handicap for the economies in our sample. 
This absence is decisive as is the significant negative sign which leaves us to suppose the type 
of investment coming into the country. With all the more reason, this would be horizontal FDI 
influenced by annuity together with the cost and intensity of poorly qualified labour, 
disconnected from a country’s structural capacity to reproduce. The negativity of the effects 
of absence of human capital affects above all else vertical FDI and transfers of knowledge and 
technologies. The high values for its coefficient suggest, among other things, that foreign 
investors tend to integrate a country’s cognitive potential into their decision-support model. 
                                                 
14 We re-ran the tests excluding the HIV/AIDS variable but retaining the social risk. Irrespective of estimator, the social risk is barely 
significant even though it retains its negative sign. By contrast, the variable moves closer to significativity when we include the level of HIV 
prevalence. This cushions the assumption of interactive simultaneity between the two variables regarding DFI.  Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
18 
 
As expected, our different tests underscore a negative but faintly significant correlation 
between FDI and the social risk (column 3: 10% with random effects and 20% with HT). The 
low level of the threshold of significativity backs our previous analyses of the link between 
the two variables. Two interpretations may be tendered to justify this: i) either the social 
impact social of the military, civil or ethnic wars is low or short-lived; ii) or the major part of 
investment is localized in annuity sectors whose production is exclusively export-focused and 
is given greater protection in the event of major instabilities. The second option seems more 
plausible and is defended, for example, by P. Hugon (2006). Generally speaking, the 
economic and strategic issues in these sectors prompt local governments to become deeply 
involved and, through a ricochet effect, to protect international capital in the event of major 
instabilities in order to reassure international investors and ensure the continuity of incoming 
flows. This is how it works in Nigeria, the Congo and Angola with regards oil industry 
investments. Other econometric tests have been conducted to analyse the depth of links 
between socio-political instabilities with related social risks, and foreign direct investment.   
The corruption factor is not clearly significant. The findings are hardly satisfactory. Despite 
the unexpected sign of the coefficient, the non significativity of this factor with the HT 
estimator is not that surprising when we go deeper into our analysis. According to 
Transparency International, the nature of corruption in Africa has a high political and 
bureaucratic slant, meaning that it affects incoming public capital, as it happens, public aid for 
development (or financial loans) more than it does private capital. Now, the FDI we are 
considering is of a private order, the capital invested is not only managed and steered by the 
holder companies but also pre-targeted in a specific economic field. Thus, the chances of local 
public authorities laying their hands on this private foreign capital are low, even though these 
same States have virtually full management control over the loans and public aid granted 
respectively by international institutions and developed countries.  
 Contrary to certain works, the impact of the volatility of real exchange rates (vs. the dollar), 
is virtually nil and not significant (with the HT estimator) for the 28 African countries 
involved in our study. This result is explained primarily by the scope and nature of FDI 
attracted by the continent. The low level of portfolio investment and the inadequacy and 
immaturity of financial structures go a long way to explain the absence of any significant 
correlation between FDI and real exchange rate volatility.   
Table 4 below shows how socio-political instability, associated with the resulting social risk, 
influences the composite variables that determine foreign investment. To express these 
composite variables, we have calculated them based on the absolute value of the coefficients 
of components from regression 2 of Table 3 (with random effects)
15.  The estimation method 
lies with the Hausman-Taylor estimator of instrumental variables (estimations are corrected 
plus heteroskedasticity). Regression 1 firstly tests the composite indicators plus the 
population. In regression 2, we introduce the social risk then successively we integrate the 
presence of regional organizations - SADC, CEDEAO and CEMAC – with regressions 3, 4 
and 5 respectively before estimating them simultaneously (column 6). Regression 7 concerns 
the estimation of composite variables and population cross-referenced with socio-political 
instability.  
                                                 
15 The coefficients of column 2 with random effects are chosen to avoid any interference with the social risk variable and to involve as many 




Table 4. Behaviour of social risk on indicators likely to influence incoming FDI  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
1 − t y   -0.621 -0.673 -0.720 -0.713 -0.717 -0.691 0.073 
  (2.69)*** 
 
(2.92)*** (3.37)*** (3.32)*** (3.36)*** (3.18)***  (0.48) 
IPE  -0.258 -0.315 -0.331 -0.332 -0.327 -0.312   
  (1.67)* 
 
(2.01)** (2.10)** (2.11)** (2.08)**  (1.96)*   
DHUM  -0.603 -0.738 -0.837 -0.946 -0.925 -0.696   
  (1.27) 
 
(1.54) (1.86)*  (2.12)**  (2.07)**  (1.36)   
DINF  0.921 0.882 0.912 0.887 0.880 0.954   
  (6.32)*** 
 
(6.07)*** (6.35)*** (6.26)*** (6.19)*** (6.20)***   
POP  -0.045 -0.020 -0.204 -0.158 -0.079 -0.197   
  (0.13) 
 
(0.07) (0.74) (0.58) (0.28) (0.66)   
Social risk    -0.155 -0.167 -0.171 -0.171 -0.155   
   (1.57)  (1.71)*  (1.75)*  (1.75)*  (1.57)  
DINF*social risk         0.876 
         (7.07)*** 
 
POP*social risk         -0.092 
         (2.60)*** 
 
IPE * social risk         -0.350 
         (3.27)*** 
 
DHUM * social risk         -0.585 
         (2.64)*** 
SADC     -0.610    -0.563  
     (1.13)    (0.55) 
 
 
CEDEAO       0.361  -0.021  
       (0.63)  (0.02) 
 
 
CEMAC         0.368  0.020  
       (0.50)  (0.02) 
 
 
Constant  11.977 12.728 15.031 14.051 12.905 13.782 -0.818 

















Wald Test, Chi2 















* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In parenthesis, the absolute values of robust t-
student. The p-value of the Sargan test applied to each regression is unable to reject the null hypothesis for 
instrument validity. The volatility of $ exchange rates and land area have been excluded for reasons of non 




The first regression shows that the condition of infrastructures has an attractive role in that 
there emerges a positive significant correlation between DINF and incoming foreign capital. 
This is not so for political and economic innovation and human development, whose 
coefficients are negative and diversely significant.  Compared with reference column 1 
results, the IPE coefficient gains value (-0.258 to -0.315) and significativity (shifting from 
10% to 5%), likewise for DHUM (-0.603 to -0.738 and 20% to 15%) when the social risk 
variable is introduced. Despite the low significativity (15%)  of the direct correlation with 
incoming FDI, the presence of the proxy of socio-political instability tends to weigh heavily 
on the negative impact of these two composite indicators and to lightly scratch the surface of 
that for infrastructures. Regression 7 cushions these results. Indeed, when cross-referencing 
IPE, DHUM and DINF with social risk to appreciate interactive patterns, we observe that 
only the cross-referenced term of DINF * social risk retains its level of significativity and 
positivity, while the other cross-referenced terms have even more significant negative 
influences (1%). In other words, the consequences linked to war or civil or military unrest 
affect more a country’s attraction potential and optimal diversification of invested resources. 
Put differently, social risk does not, as such, directly harm the decision to invest in a country; 
it affects above all else the broadening of investment and impairs a country’s capacity to 
create opportunities and take advantage of effects of externality. This may certainly explain 
why countries such as Angola and Nigeria receive significant levels of foreign capital, despite 
unstable social conditions and without this capital being invested anywhere else but in oil. 
In column 6, the simultaneous introduction of regional economic unions with related silent 
variables significantly reduces the negative interference of social risk on composite indicators. 
This result raises questions we might ask about the role regional organizations actually play in 
Africa to solidify the economies of member states. Is the interconnection of regional 
organizations a solution to cancel out the instabilities and risks generated by conflicts? The 
credibility of regional integration to stimulate greater incoming foreign investment in the area 
lies not only with the specific characteristics of member states but also with the dynamism 
and determination to create regional space capital. While this is still a major role, its impact 
and scope are inadequate in the case of Africa owing to the traditional trajectory of FDI across 
the continent. 
Conclusion 
In this contribution, we have set out on an empirical search for factors likely to have an 
influence on the credibility of African countries with a view to attracting more direct foreign 
investment. One of the points addressed concerns the hypothesis whereby anticipations 
associated with general economic outlooks for these countries impact ongoing flows of 
incoming capital. The other point examines, on the one hand, the effects relative to socio-
political instability approximated with the social consequences of conflicts, and on the other 
the role that might be played by the processes of regionalization to boost the attractiveness of 
countries. With a panel of 28 African countries, the results of estimations obtained using the 
Hausman-Taylor method of instrumental variables show that the impact of projections on an 
ongoing decision to invest in the continent is not statistically significant.  Our results also 
show that even though negative, the direct correlation between social risk, the proxy of socio-
political instability, and flows of foreign investment is not systematically significant. Indeed, 
flows of DFI do not behave in the same way in countries afflicted by social and political 
crises. What does emerge however is that these instabilities undermine national competencies. 
We observe an effect of simultaneity between HIV/AIDS and social risk in the sense that the Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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negative impact of the former on FDI tends to increase significantly when introducing the 
instability variable. However, the introduction simultaneously of regionalization processes 
into our estimations tends to reduce the adverse effects of instability on certain FDI 
explicative variables. This result works like an argument in favour of the emergence of 
economic blocks in Africa. Lastly, contrary to certain studies, our econometrical results show 
that corruption in Africa has not reached the critical threshold where it would heavily penalize 
foreign private capital. Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Appendix 1.  Socio-political instability and incoming flows of DFI to 














Evolution of DFI flows during periods of 





1991 - 2004 
 





MAGR = + 18.70 %; for an aggregate of 
$12.33 billion. The period of instability 
represented 67.4% of incoming investment 




1975 – 2005 
 
Civil war: armed struggle for 
the independence of  Cabinda 
(1 000 000) 
           
6 
MAGR = +15.75%; for an aggregate of 
$16.73 billion between 1980 and 2004. 
Angola reported an historical peak in 2003 




1993 – 2005 
 
Ethnic war and civil violence: 
Hutus vs Tutsis (100 000) 
 
4 
MAGR = +1.57%. The period of instability 
represented over one-third (36.75%) of 
incoming capital between 1980 & 2007. 
1997 – 1999  Civil war (10 000)  3  MAGR  = + 87.35%  Congo 
Brazzaville  2002 - 2003  Urban and civil violence (500)  1  Growth rate = +146.17% 
1977 – 1983  Armed repression and civil 
violence (10 000) 
2  MAGR = - 178.39%   
1992 – 1996  Ethnic and civil violence 
(10 000) 







Civil and international war 
involving Rwanda and Uganda 
(2 500 000) 
5  MAGR = + 32.41% 
 
Ivory Coast  
 
2000 – 2005 
Civil war: division North-
South-West (3000) 
         
2 
MAGR= +4.85%; the 5 years of instability 
represented almost one third of (31.18%) of 
incoming investment between 1980 & 2007. 
1974 – 1991  Ethnic and civil war (750 000)  6  MAGR = + 16.10% (1980-1991)  Ethiopia  
1998 – 2000  At war against Eritrea 
(100 000)  
5  MAGR = -19.77% 
1991 – 1993  Ethnic and civil violence      
(2 000) 
1  MAGR= - 52.62%   
Kenya  
2008  Civil violence further to 
presidential elections (1500) 
3   
1990 – 1997  Civil war (40 000)  4  MAGR = - 0.29 %  Liberia 
2000 – 2003  Civil war (1 000)  1  MAGR = +105.67 % 




MAGR = +11.86 % 
Mozambique  1981 – 1992  Civil war (500 000)  2  MAGR = + 42.20 % 
1980 – 1985  Civil and ethnic violence 
(9 000) 
2  MAGR = - 2.19% 
1986 – 1993  War of religions (Christians 










2001 – 2008 
Instability and violence in the 
North (Kano); armed rebellion 
and confrontations in the oil-




MAGR=  + 38.45% (2001/2007). Despite 
instability and the security risks, Nigeria 
continues to receive significant foreign 
investment. 
1990 – 1994  Attack on the Hutu regime by 
Tutsi rebels (15 000) 
3  MAGR= - 6.21% 
1994  Ethnic genocide (500 000)   7  MAGR = - 99.98%. In 1994, net flows of 




1994 – > 
1998  
Ethnic war: Hutus vs the Tutsi 
regime (1 500) 
3  MAGR= + 489.01%. On average, between 
1990 and 1998 (a period of high instability 
and war) incoming DFI recorded just a tiny 
fall of -0.72% Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Senegal  1992 – 1999   Ethnic and civil violence 
(Casamance; 3 000) 
 
1 
MAGR = + 27.80 %. This period 
represented 40.53% of net incoming capital 
between 1980 and 2007. 
Somalia   1988 – 
>2008  
Civil war (100 000)  5  MAGR = + 98.01%. Before the war, 
Somalia was already reporting a negative 














MAGR = + 12.45 %. The beginning of the 
intensification of foreign investment (cf. the 
massive arrival of Chinese capital) for 
Sudanese oil drilling coincided with the 
beginning of the “genocide” in Darfour (F. 
William Engdahl, 2007) 
RSA  1983 – 1999  Civil and inter-ethnic violence 
(20 000) 
3  MAGR = + 19.10% 
 
1965 – 1994 
 
Civil war (75 000) 
 
4 
MAGR = -31.80% (during this period, little 
was known about oil in Chad. Drilling 












Armed rebellion against the 




MAGR = - 0.56%. The drop in foreign 
investment in 2007 was marked essentially 
by the decision by the Deby regime to expel 
certain oil companies (cf. Chevron & 
Petronas) for non-payment of tax. 
1981 – 1986  Armed repression (100 000)  4  MAGR = + 1.81%  Uganda  
1986 – 2006  Civil ethnic war (16 000)  2  MAGR = + 26.08% 
Zimbabwe  1981 – 1987  Civil, inter-ethnic and racial 
violence (3 000) 
2  MAGR = + 52.36% 
Note.  Social magnitude refers to the social and systemic impact of episodes of war or violence and civil unrest. The scale ranges 
from 1 (very low impact) to 10 (very high impact). Source s: (1) Centre for Systemic Peace, 2009 (for the periods, types of 





Descriptive statistics of variables per period of stability (0) and instability (1)  
-> Trouble = 0 (no unrest)    
    Variable |       Obs     Mean    Standard discrepancy    Min        Max 
log(DFI/gdp) |       589   -4.615679    2.061376  -13.59419   2.827356 
    log(gdp) |       631    22.09308    1.395492   15.22226   26.35026 
log(IDOM/gdp)|       608   -1.710256    .5871271  -6.775826  -.3437595 
  Log(INCIT) |       630    3.898241     .318505   2.302585   4.421247 
  log(1-edu) |       631    3.606262    .5460173    1.96229   4.490928 
    log(HIV) |       388   -3.386702    1.806413  -6.906755  -.9002457 
    log(pop) |       631    15.67767    1.239296   12.26737   18.53472 
  log(route) |       631    10.00072    1.263696   7.481556   12.82444 
   log(elec) |       421    5.537873    1.179194   2.906351   8.494161 
  log(PHONE) |       301      .08546    2.833607  -8.240197   4.481872 
        demo |       631   -1.768621    6.526651        -10         10 
     logcorr)|       631    1.279825    .6694787   .2744368   3.401197 
Social risk|       631           0           0          0          0 
 
-> Unrest = 1 (in the present of unrest)    
    Variable |       Obs     mean    standard discrepancy     Min     Max 
log(DFI/GDP) |       133   -5.402179    2.362344    -15.444  -1.219085 
     Ln(gdp) |       153    23.21785    1.486726    20.6069   25.95069 
log(IDOM/GDP)|       149   -2.106741    .7169133  -4.592226   -.738313 
   log(INCIT)|       150    3.761626    .5151238   2.068154   4.352855 
  log(1-edu) |       153    3.592346    .5336716   2.090974   4.396438 
     Log(HIV)|        81   -4.524474    1.872011  -6.906755  -1.020141 
    log(pop) |       153    16.72862    1.309484   13.80832   18.81335 
  log(route) |       153    10.76431    1.061502   8.187021   12.78716 
   log(elec) |       139    5.497287    1.408687   3.337035   8.416527 
  log(phone) |        86   -.9449997    2.889286  -6.756783   3.496608 
        demo |       153   -1.980392    5.413762         -9          9 
   log(corr) |       153    1.424086    .7876219    .356675   3.110318 
Social risk |       153    2.196078    1.308167          0          5 
 Foreign Direct Investment in Africa… 
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Correlation between variables            
              IDE        GDP     IDOM     INCIT   1-edu     HIV     demo 
      DFI |   1.0000  
      gdp |  -0.2800   1.0000  
     IDOM |  -0.1076  -0.1071   1.0000  
    INCIT |  -0.0875   0.2698   0.2094   1.0000  
   L1-edu |  -0.1842  -0.0830  -0.1747   0.0408   1.0000  
      HIV |   0.1015  -0.3400  -0.0699  -0.1344  -0.4144   1.0000  
     demo |   0.1341   0.1180   0.1421   0.1422  -0.3756   0.1957   1.0000  
     CORR |   0.0826  -0.3199  -0.1516  -0.3772   0.2713   0.1689  -0.2667  
    route |  -0.2801   0.5962  -0.1508   0.0470   0.0220   0.0313   0.0042  
     Elec |  -0.1608   0.3496   0.3328   0.3413  -0.5879   0.1145   0.3435  
    PHONE |   0.2790   0.0610   0.0926   0.0460  -0.4107   0.1817   0.3484  
      POP |  -0.2358   0.7440  -0.3119   0.0859   0.2361  -0.1965  -0.0511  
     RISK |  -0.1714   0.3244  -0.2229  -0.1326  -0.0181  -0.2889  -0.0375  
 
                  
              CORR      route    elec    phone      pop     risk 
     CORR |   1.0000  
    route |  -0.0656   1.0000  
     elec |  -0.4515   0.4335   1.0000  
    Phone |  -0.0331  -0.0752   0.2409   1.0000  
      POP |  -0.0197   0.7271  -0.1334  -0.2108   1.0000  
     RISK |   0.0771   0.2886   0.0368  -0.1293   0.3350   1.0000 
 
The 28 countries making up our sample: 
CEDEAO: Benin, Burkina-Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo  
CEMAC: Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Chad  
SADC: South Africa (RSA), Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Malawi,  Mauritius Island, Mozambique, Namibia,   Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
EAC: Kenya 
UMA: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia 
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